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This paper examines monetary policy in a currency union whose member countries exhi-
bit heterogeneous rates of limited asset markets participation (LAMP). As a result risk
sharing among member countries is imperfect and the monetary transmission mecha-
nism can dier across countries. In the limit the elasticity of output to the union-wide
nominal interest rate can be of opposite sign in dierent countries.
I develop a tractable model in which the dispersion of asset markets participation
(AMP) becomes a key parameter. While monetary policy can guarantee determinacy
by following an active or passive rule depending on the sign of the interest-elasticity of
output, ignoring dispersion can lead to incorrect computation of the sign and the size
of the latter. Taking the heterogeneity into account is thus central for sound policy
Furthermore, due to the failure of risk sharing, determinacy for union-aggregates
does not guarantee determinacy in every member country. However, the more open
a country is in trade terms, the greater the rate of LAMP for which the country still
displays equilibrium determinacy. For complete openness, determinacy is guaranteed.
This underlines the importance of risk sharing and trade integration for the functioning
of a currency union.
Considering the optimal union-wide targeting rule, a higher mean and dispersion of
LAMP increase the desired ination volatility and decrease the desired output volatility.
The implied optimal Taylor rule shows that subject to the Taylor principle, the higher
are mean and dispersion of LAMP, the softer should be the response of the nominal
interest rate to expected ination.
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i1 Introduction
Imperfect risk sharing and asymmetric monetary transmission channels are real world chal-
lenges for monetary policy in a currency union. This paper examines in a theoretical context
the implication of these features for monetary policy in a currency union. More precisely, I
examine monetary policy in a currency union whose member countries exhibit heterogenous
rates of limited asset markets participation (LAMP). Due to this heterogenous LAMP, per-
fect risk sharing across member countries fails and the monetary transmission mechanism
can dier dramatically across countries. Potentially, countries could exhibit elasticities of
output to the union-wide nominal interest rate of opposite sign. This provides an extreme
test of the implications of structural asymmetry and imperfect risk sharing for monetary
policy in a currency union.
Limited asset markets participation, i.e. the fact that not all households in an economy
participate in asset markets, is an acknowledged feature of real world economies.1 The
concern of this paper is what LAMP means for monetary policy in a currency union, in
particular when it diers across countries. Tables 1 and 2 present data for stockownership
and homeownership for the two biggest currency unions, the US and the euro area. Both
are imperfect indicators of asset markets participation (AMP). Homeownership may often
require nancing, but not always. Similarly, while stock ownership may be sucient to
indicate AMP, it is not necessary. What Tables 1 and 2 show is that, depending on the
indicator, LAMP can be high; homeownership for instance is more prevalent than stock
ownership. More than that, it diers markedly across countries, although the euro area
exhibits considerably more heterogeneity than the US, which also has a greater level of
AMP according to both measures.
1LAMP proves dicult to quantify. On the one hand, this is due to the variety of asset market parti-
cipation, be it through stock ownership, corporate or government bonds, housing nance, or simply a bank
account. On the other hand, in many models asset markets are simply a set of state-contingent securities,
which makes it dicult to say what the best real world equivalent for them is. Thus, while one can argue
over the best indicator for LAMP and its correct level, its signicance is clear. Campbell and Mankiw
(1989) attempt to quantify LAMP based on aggregate time series. They nd that around 0.4 to 0.5 of the
US population consume their current income and interpret this as the rate of LAMP. Mulligan and Sala-i
Martin (2000) present data from the 1989 US Survey of Consumer Finances according to which 59% of the
population held no interest-bearing assets, while 25% did not even have a checking account. More recently,
Vissing-Jrgensen (2002) reports PSID data according to which 21.75% of US population hold shares and
31.40% own bonds. Similarly, based on 1999 PSID data, Caner and Wol (2004) classify, according to net
worth, 25.9% of the population as asset poor. Excluding home equity from net worth even 41.7% can be
considered asset-poor. Meanwhile, Bilbiie and Straub (2006) estimate the level of LAMP to be 0.44 during
the pre-Volcker era and 0.24 during the Volcker-Greenspan period. Coenen and Straub (2005), by contrast,
investigate the European Monetary Union and estimate the level in the euro area to lie between 0.24 and
0.37.
1Table 1: Dispersion of Euro Area Asset Markets Participation















Standard Deviation 0.13 0.12
Coecient of Variation CV1  0.62 0.18
CV 2
1  0.39 0.03
Notes: The Stock Ownership data are taken from table 1 in Christelis et al. (2009) who
obtain it from SHARE data. The Home Ownership rate data aren taken from table 1 in
European Central Bank (2009), where it appears as 'Owner-Occupancy Rate'.
Table 2: Dispersion of US Asset Markets Participation







Standard Deviation 0.06 0.04
Coecient of Variation CV1  0.11 0.06
CV 2
1  0.01 0.003
Notes: The data are taken from table 1 in Christelis et al. (2009) who obtain it from
SHARE data.
2In this paper, by contrast, we allow for heterogenous LAMP. That is, in every country
there is a rate of LAMP and these rates can dier across countries. Heterogenous LAMP
directly leads to an asymmetric transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Thus, the
rst question of interest is what this asymmetry in the monetary transmission mechanism
means for the union-wide interest rate policy. As a modelling tool LAMP is interesting in
that, rstly, it allows us to investigate asymmetries in the transmission mechanism with
just two statistics, its mean rate and its dispersion across other countries. Secondly, we can
study with LAMP not least for the most extreme test of structural heterogeneity, where the
interest-elasticity of output in one country may be negative while in another it is positive.
Thus, a currency union model with heterogenous LAMP can serve as a laboratory to explore
how much heterogeneity in the monetary transmission mechanism is feasible in a currency
union. In this sense LAMP can proxy for other heterogeneities in labour, product, housing
or nancial markets which are certainly important.2 Another convenient feature of LAMP is
that it allows us to investigate the importance of nancial market integration for a currency
union. As Non-Ricardian agents have no access to asset markets, the rate of LAMP in a
country directly determines its extent of nancial-risk sharing with the rest of the currency
union.
To investigate the importance of heterogenous LAMP in a currency union, I introduce
LAMP as modelled in Bilbiie (2008) into the currency union model of Gal  and Monacelli
(2008). The latter build a model of a monetary union made up of a continuum of small
open economies each of which has mass zero. This implies that each member country by
itself does not aect any other member country or the union as a whole. While Gal  and
Monacelli (2008) allow for asymmetric shocks across countries, all members of the currency
union are structurally symmetric. There is no LAMP, so that in all countries all households
are Ricardian and complete nancial markets ensure perfect international risk sharing across
countries.3
2Cecchetti (1999) identies dierences in legal structures, size and concentration of banking in rm
nance as well as industrial structure. Maclennan et al. (1999) identify signicant dierences in nancial
market capitalisations relative to GDP which are based on dierent, pension, banking, corporate nance
systems. Furthermore dierences in tax systems and credit availability change the eects of housing wealth
on consumption, which is also documented more recently by Muellbauer (2007) comparing the US and UK.
3Next to Gal  and Monacelli (2008) there are more conventional two-country models of a currency union,
such as the one by Beetsma and Jensen (2005) who build on Benigno (2004). There are, however, several
advantages to the framework of Gal  and Monacelli (2008). Two-country models are less suitable to analyse
a small open economy within a currency union. Furthermore, Gal  and Monacelli (2008) allows to derive a
fully quadratic loss function avoiding multiplicative terms in dierent variables as obtained by Beetsma and
Jensen (2005). The presence of more than two countries also makes the mean and dispersion of variables,
which are the focus of the present analysis, more meaningful. Importantly, while Beetsma and Jensen (2005)
3Bilbiie (2008) extends the benchmark New Keynesian model summarised for instance in
Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003) or Gal  (2008).4 Bilbiie (2008) shows that LAMP
leads to a bifurcation of dynamics. If the rate of LAMP remains below a certain threshold
value, the dynamics of the benchmark New Keynesian model are preserved. Indeed the
eectiveness of interest rate policy increases relative to the standard case. If the rate of
LAMP, however, exceeds a certain threshold then the IS relation changes sign. Behind
this result lies the interrelation between labour and asset markets. The intuition is the
following:5 if Non-Ricardian households exceed a certain threshold proportion, then a fall
of the interest rate has the following eect. Ricardian households plan to save less and
consume more. With a high proportion of Non-Ricardian agents this increase in demand
increases marginal cost so much that Ricardian agents anticipate so high a fall in potential
prots that they end up cutting back consumption rather than increasing. This way the
fall in the interest rate can lead to an overall fall of consumption and output. When the
interest-elasticity of output is negative, this in turn has the policy implication that the
Taylor principle is also reversed in the sense that determinacy requires a passive policy in
the sense that in a Taylor-type instrument rule the coecient on ination is smaller than
one.
The main results of the present paper are the following. I show how the heterogeneity
of LAMP can be captured solely in terms of the mean rate of LAMP and the dispersion of
LAMP. The heterogeneity of LAMP turns out to matter crucially for dynamics and deter-
minacy. Disregarding dispersion will be quantitatively and can be qualitatively inaccurate,
as for a given mean rate of LAMP, greater dispersion can make the sign of the union-wide IS
relation change. Depending on the sign of this elasticity, monetary policy can then achieve
union-wide equilibrium determinacy by following either an active or passive Taylor rule.
As every country technically has a measure of zero, the determinacy conditions identi-
ed for the union as a whole are insucient to guarantee that in a particular country the
equilibrium path is determinate. Strictly speaking no country has mass zero, this assump-
tion may simply be as inapplicable to the real world. The most important dimension of
assume that purchasing-power-parity (PPP) holds at all times, the introduction of home-bias in Gal  and
Monacelli (2008) allows for deviations from PPP. This turns out to be particularly important when risk
sharing among countries is not perfect.
4Gal  et al. (2004), too, study the implications of Non-Ricardian agents in a model with capital and
non-separable utility. These assumptions, however, preclude analytical results, making Bilbiie (2008) the
more convenient reference point.
5For a more detailed account see Bilbiie (2008).
4the measure zero assumption is that the interest rate set at the union-level does not syste-
matically react to the conditions of any particular country. In the euro area, for instance,
country weights entering the HICP price index are calculated based on its share of private
domestic consumption expenditure in the euro area. Ination of the HICP index is in turn
the variable which the European Central Bank (ECB) targets as part of its ination tar-
geting strategy. While in 2006 Germany has the largest weight with 28.7%, the values for
Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg are only 2.2%, 1.3% and 0.2% respectively. Out of the
12 earliest member of the European Monetary Union, only France, German, Italy and Spain
have a weight in the union of more than 5%. Based on their small weight, the assumption
that the union-wide interest rate policy does not react systematically to the conditions in
the smaller countries is plausible and deserves scrutiny.
For country-level determinacy I thus demonstrate that, if the rate of LAMP in a country
exceeds a certain threshold, equilibrium in that country is indeterminate. This is essentially
due to a failure of risk sharing, as risk with the rest of the union is only shared by the
Ricardian consumers. While the union as a whole can react to a negatively sloping IS
relation by adopting a passive interest-rate rule, an individual country cannot do so and
runs into diculties if its rate of LAMP exceeds a certain critical value. However, we
also nd that the more open a country is, i.e. the less home bias it exhibits, the higher
the rate of LAMP for which equilibrium in that country is determinate. Indeed, in the
absence of home bias a country can guarantee equilibrium determinacy. This emphasises
the importance of risk sharing and trade-integration in a currency union. This further
lends support to McKinnon (1963) who argued that openness with potential currency-area
partners increases the appeal of a xed exchange-rate between them.
Finally, I identify the optimal policy which minimises the union-wide quadratic social
loss. Optimal ination volatility increases in the mean and dispersion of LAMP while
optimal output volatility decreases in those parameters. An implied optimal Taylor-rule
recommends, subject to the satisfaction of the Taylor principle, that the higher the mean
and the dispersion of LAMP, the less aggressive should be the response of the nominal
interest-rate to ination.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the microfoundations in
detail. Section 3 derives structural IS relations and Phillips curves for the union as a whole,
as well as a representative country. Section 4 discusses the requirements for equilibrium
5determinacy, with 4.1 discussing the union as a whole. However, because a particular
country c has measure zero within the union, it could be indeterminate without aecting
the rest of the union. Thus, section 4.2 turns to the conditions for which a particular country
c exhibits equilibrium determinacy. Section 5 identies the optimal monetary policy which
minimises the union-wide quadratic social loss.
2 Microfoundations
2.1 Households
The general form of notation is summarised in appendix 7.1. The model of the currency
union follows Gal  and Monacelli (2008). The currency union is made up of a continuum of
small open economies. Each country's economy is indexed by c 2 [0;1]. As each country c
has measure zero, its domestic policy does not have any impact on the other union members.
All union members have the same preferences, technology and market structure. However,
they can be subject to imperfectly correlated shocks.
Here I go beyond Gal  and Monacelli (2008) by assuming that asset markets participation
is limited. More than that, the degree of asset markets participation is allowed to vary
across countries. I thus assume that in each country a fraction (1   c) of the population
are asset market participants who can smooth their consumption over time through asset
markets. These consumers are called 'Ricardian' consumers. The variables pertaining to
these households will be superscripted by R. The remaining fraction of the population
c consists of households not participating in asset markets. These consumers are called
'Non-Ricardian' as they are unable to smooth their consumption across time through asset
markets participation. Their variables carry the superscript N.
Let Z 2 [N;R] denote the type of household. C
Z;c
t is the total consumption by all















 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor common to all households, Nt is the supply of
labour in terms of hours worked,  is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity, while  de-
termines the weight on the disutility of labour supply. As in Bilbiie (2008) the log/constant-
6relative-risk-aversion-utility function is chosen as it delivers constant hours worked for Non-
Ricardian agents. This brings analytical convenience without being necessary for any of the
results.
2.1.1 Consumption and Price Indices
Aggregation across Consumer Types In any country c the consumption of Ricardian
consumers C
R;c
t and the consumption of Non-Ricardian consumers C
N;c
t is aggregated as
follows:
Cc





The model will be log-linearised around the non-stochastic steady state, where (2) becomes
^ cc
t = (1   c)^ c
R;c
t + c^ c
N;c
t : (3)
Similarly, labour supply aggregates as
Nc




t ; or ^ nc
t = (1   c)^ n
R;c
t : (4)
For the last equality note that ^ n
N;c
t = 0, as hours worked by non-Ricardian agents are
constant.
Aggregation of Domestic and Imported Consumption For every household type
Z let lower-scripted country-variables denote the place of production and upper-scripted
country-variables the place of consumption. Total consumption of consumer Z is composed
of consumption of goods produced domestically, C
Z;c
c;t , and goods which are produced in the
rest of the union C
Z;c











(1   )(1 ) ; (5)
where  2 [0;1] is the weight on imported goods in the utility function. For  < 1 there is
a home bias in private consumption. For  = 0, the country is essentially a closed economy.
 can thus be seen as a parameter capturing the openness of a country towards the rest of
the union.  is assumed to be the same for all countries.6
6In section 4.3 I consider the case of  varying across countries.
7There is a continuum j 2 [0;1] of dierentiated consumption goods, where  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitutions between any two goods produced within a country. C
Z;c
c;t is the
























f;t is the log of an index of the quantity of goods consumed in country c which













is the price of good j produced in country f, expressed in units of the single currency. The












































































t . For any individual country c, P
t also represents the price index for
all imported goods. Further, the optimal allocation of expenditures on imported goods by














f;t df = P
t C
Z;c







Then the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods in that



























8Terms of Trade The bilateral terms of trade between countries c and f, i.e. the price of
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R 1
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f;t df. The CPI index dened in (8)
















Hence, the dierence between CPI ination and domestic ination is proportional with
coecient  to the percentage change in the terms of trade.
2.1.2 Ricardian Consumers
Financial markets are assumed to be complete, while the economy is cashless. The monetary
authority denes a unit of account in which all assets are denoted. In terms of this unit
of account, B
R;c
t denotes the agent's end-of-period portfolio holdings of all state-contingent
assets except shares. A
R;c






t is the average market value of shares in intermediate good rms at time t. D
R;c
t are real
dividend payo of these shares. The nominal wage is Wt and wage income WtNt represents
all non-nancial income. Due to full arbitrage, arbitrage opportunities are absent. Thus,
the current and the future asset portfolio, which is random, are related through a unique


























. In terms of the stochastic discount factor, the one-period short-
term riskless nominal interest rate, it, is given by 1
1+{t = EtQt;t+1.








































Using (10) and conditioning on the optimal allocation of household expenditures, the period























t ) + Wc
t N
R;c











Imposing the usual no-Ponzi condition for each state and using the arbitrage relations
(14) and (15) as well as the relations on prices (10), we obtain the intertemporal budget























The problem of the representative asset market participant is to maximise (1) subject to










t ); or wc
t   p
cpi;c
t = ^ c
R;c
t + ^ n
R;c
t : (17)



















; or ^ c
R;c
t = Et^ c
R;c
t+1   (^ {t   Etc
t+1): (18)
102.1.3 Non-Ricardian Consumers
Non-Ricardian consumers consume their wage income in each period. Thus, the period











t = ^ c
N;c
t : (19)
Non-Ricardian Consumers maximise utility (1) subject to the constraint (19). This is










t ); or wc
t   p
cpi;c
t = ^ c
N;c
t ; (20)
where again use is made of ^ n
N;c
t = 0.
2.1.4 International Risk Sharing
























f;t)1 , for all c;f 2 [0;1] and for
all t. The constant #c depends on initial conditions regarding relative net asset holdings,
Gal  and Monacelli (2008). We thus can assume initial conditions such that #c = # = 1 for





f;t)1 , which we can log-linearise and aggregate over all
countries f to obtain
^ c
R;c
t = ^ c
R;
t + (1   )sc
t; (22)







Note that (22) implies that only Ricardian consumers with access to asset markets can
share risk internationally. In the presence of Non-Ricardian consumers, perfect international
risk sharing therefore breaks down. This break-down in risk sharing has important eects
on dynamics, as discussed below.
112.2 Firms













which aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Demand for each









t , while the price index is given in (7).
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist indexed by j using technology
given by
Y c
t (j) = Ac
tNc
t (j)   Fc for Nc
t (j) > Fc; (24)
and 0 otherwise. The xed cost Fc is assumed to be common to all rms in country c.





t   Fc; (25)










dj. Note that the existence of price-
dispersion is contingent on sticky prices, which are introduced below. Under exible prices,
there is no price-dispersion. It is straightforward to show that equilibrium variations in
lnt are of second order. Thus, log-linearised to rst order, (25) becomes
^ yc
t = (1 + )^ nc
t + (1 + )ac
t: (26)











t (j). Prots aggregated

















































aggregate prots are distributed to asset holds as dividends.
Cost Minimisation Cost minimisation by the rm, taking wages as given, implies a





t . Following Clarida et al. (1999), we assume that a
cost-push shock e  1uc








t; or ^ mcc
t = wc
t   ac
t +   1uc
t: (27)
12Ination Dynamics with Calvo Price-Setting The derivation of a relation between
ination and marginal cost requires an assumption about price-setting. Here this follows
the discrete-time variant of Calvo (1983). In this set-up the opportunity of rms to adjust
prices follows an exogenous Poisson process. Independent of history, there is a constant
probability of (1   !) that a rm can adjust its price, so that each period a fraction ! of
rms leaves the prices of their product unchanged. The expected waiting time for the next
price adjustment is therefore (1   !) 1. Based on this assumption, the New Keynesian
relation between ination and marginal cost takes the form
c
t = Etc
t+1 +  (mcc
t   pc
t); (28)
where   
(1 !)(1 !)
! and mcc
t is the nominal marginal cost of supply.7
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section we derive the economy-wide relations from the micro-founded optimisation
problems solved by consumers and rms. The model derived nests the closed economy of
Bilbiie (2008) for a complete home bias of  = 0. The model also reduces to the symmetric
currency union of Gal  and Monacelli (2008) when rate of LAMP is set to zero in all countries.
3.1 Aggregation
Goods market clearing requires (3) to hold. Labour market clearing requires (4). Further, as
markets are complete and agents trading these assets are identical, state-contingent assets
are in zero net supply. By Walras' Law, the remaining market must clear, too. Market







To study dynamics, I take a log-linear approximation around the non-stochastic steady
state. I nd the steady state by considering the optimality conditions when all variables
are constant and all shocks absent. The Euler equation (18) relates the steady state riskless
one period net nominal interest rate to the subjective discount factor 1 + {t =  1.
7For details see e.g. Woodford (2003) or Gal  (2008).
13Within each country, the steady state mirrors the closed-economy version case considered
in Bilbiie (2008). In steady state all rms are symmetric and apply a gross mark-up 
 1 of
over nominal marginal cost. Dene the steady state net markup which producers charge as
  (   1) 1 and the share of xed cost in steady state output as FY  Fc
Y c. Assume that
the steady state net markup which producers charge is the same across all countries. As
shown in Bilbiie (2008) and detailed in appendix 7.2, the steady state share of real prots










1+ . If we
let the steady state net mark-up equal the output share of the xed cost, i.e.  = Fc
Y , the
steady state share of real prots in output is zero, which makes the share of real earnings
in output be equal to one. By implication, also the consumption shares or Ricardian and
Non-Ricardian agents are equal to each other and equal to one: CR;c
Y c = CN;c
Y c = 1. This
simplies the algebra while not being necessary for any of the results.
Due to the absence of prots in steady state, both types of consumers have the same
steady state budget constraint: CZ;c = Wc=PcNZ;c, for z 2 [N;R]. Similarly, the intra-
temporal optimality conditions are in steady state CZ;c = 1
(NZ;c)
Wc
Pc . This allows to solve
for the steady state consumption and types as CZ;c = 
  1
1+ Wc
Pc , while hours are NZ;c =

  1
1+. The above also implies that for both consumer types steady state consumption
equals total consumption and output CN;c = CR;c = Y c.
Regarding steady states across the union, the risk sharing condition (22) becomes CR;c =
CR;f(Sc
f;t)1 . For simplicity, I consider a symmetric steady state for which Sc




t , which we can normalise to one. The symmetric steady state Sc
f = 1 implies
that consumption of Ricardian consumers in dierent countries are equal CR;c = CR;f. As
above, we see that in each country steady state consumption of both types of consumers is
equal to each other and to country output; we also have Y c = Y f for all c;f 2 [0;1].
3.3 Goods Market Clearing
Market clearing of good j in country c requires
Y c






















Using the condition for the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and impor-































14the denitions of bilateral and eective terms of trade given in (11) and (12) we obtain an
expression for Y c
t (j), which, plugged into the denition of country c's aggregate output (23),
gives the following aggregate goods market condition
Y c










As shown in appendix 7.3, a log-linear rst order approximation of (29) around the symme-
tric steady state yields
^ yc
t = (2   )sc
t + (1   )^ cc










t df is the consumption index for the union as a whole.
Departing from the denition of aggregate consumption, we can substitute out the
consumption of non-Ricardian agents using their labour supply relation (20). Using in
turn the labour supply-relation of Ricardian consumers, (17), as well as the denition of
aggregate labour, (4), we nd a relation linking aggregate consumption, consumption by
Ricardian consumers and aggregate labour supply
^ cc




























Combining (31), (32) with (30) and the risk sharing condition for Ricardian consumers,

















1   c ^ yc











In the absence of LAMP, risk sharing across countries is perfect, as in Gal  and Monacelli
(2008). In that case the goods market clearing condition reduces to ^ yc
t = sc
t + ^ cc
t. For a
closed economy the goods market clearing condition is the familiar ^ yc
t = ^ cc
t. For an open
economy with LAMP, however, risk is not shared perfectly across countries. As a result
additional output and technology terms, of both country and the union, enter (33).
Note that we can integrate (33) over c to obtain the union-wide resource constraint,
which takes the familiar form
^ y
t = ^ c
t; (34)
15where we make use of the fact that
R 1
0 sc
t dc = 0.
3.4 Phillips Curve
Assuming Calvo price-setting, the New Keynesian relation between ination and marginal
cost is given by (28). Combing this with the result from cost-minimisation (27), the eective
terms of trade (12), the labour-supply relation of Ricardian consumers (17), condition (31)
as well as the market clearing condition (33), we obtain the following Phillips curve for
country c, expressed directly in terms of gap variables
c
t = Etc
t+1 +  c~ yc






1   c ~ yc













A union-wide Phillips curve can be obtained by integrating (35) over all countries c,

t = Et
t+1 + ~ y
t + u
t; (36)
where     and   1 + =(1 + ). Note that at the union level, the Phillips curve is
independent of the degree of asset markets participation.8
Unlike the union-wide Phillips curve, the Phillips curve for country c (35) is not invariant
to the rate of LAMP. This stems from the failure of perfect international risk sharing, as
noted in (22) and discussed in section 3.3. As a further implication, union-wide output
enters the Phillips curve of country c. Seen from the country perspective union-wide output,
however, is an exogenous shock.
3.5 IS relation
Combining the consumption Euler equation of Ricardian consumers (18) with the condition
linking the domestic producer and CPI ination rates to the terms of trade (13), the condi-
tion (31) as well as the market clearing for country c, we obtain what looks like a dynamic
IS relation for country c which here is expressed directly in terms of deviations from exible
8As discussed in Bilbiie (2008) for the closed economy, this is due to the assumption that steady state
consumption shares are equal across consumer types. Bilbiie (2005) shows that the presence of Non-Ricardian
consumers modies the elasticity of marginal cost to movements in the output gap if the steady state
consumption shares are not equal.
16price values:
c~ yc
t = cEt~ yc









1   cEt~ yc
t+1 dc; (37)




















t+1 dc is the natural real rate of interest obtaining under exible prices.
Note that from the perspective of country c, the union-wide interest rate ^ {t is exogenous, in
this sense 37 is not an IS relation in the true sense.
For  = 0 (37), reduces to the IS relation of a closed economy.9 The closed economy
case provides some context for the currency union results I present below. In the closed




1 . Now,  > 0 if and only if  < 1=[1 + =(1 + )].
For levels of LAMP greater than the RHS, the IS relation essentially switches sign. When
the IS relation switches sign, interest rate increases have an expansionary eect on output.
In the standard economy without LAMP, an increase in the interest rate leads to a fall
in demand, which leads to lower output, lower consumption and lower real wages. If there
is LAMP, but its level stays below the critical level so that  remains positive, the fall in
demand will be even greater. This is due to Non-Ricardian agents consuming their real
wage every period. For them a lower real wage directly means lower consumption, adding
to the fall in demand by Ricardian agents.
If LAMP rises to a level so that  < 0, these dynamics change. The reason lies in the
interrelation of labour and asset markets. The real wage fall reduces marginal cost and thus
has a positive eect on prots. If LAMP is high and the elasticity of labour supply low, the
prot increase leads to a positive income eect for Ricardian agents. The dividend income
each Ricardian agent is 1
1  and thus increases non-linearly in the rate of Non-Ricardian
agents. The positive income eect can overturn the usually contractionary eects of the
interest rate increase. This way the interest rate increase leads to an expansion of output.
With LAMP in the currency union, the ip in the IS relation described can also occur














































t+1 dc is the union wide
9The closed economy is considered in detail in Bilbiie (2008).
17natural real rate of interest. The next section shows how to treat the integrals over the
product of LAMP rates and output.
3.6 Terms of Trade
Combining the risk sharing condition, (22), with (31) and (32), we can write the terms of
trade exclusively as a function of output, written here directly in terms of deviations of










where c is the inverse of the elasticity of output with regard to the eective terms of trade




1   c: (40)
Note that c increases in the openness parameter  and in the labour-supply elasticity  1
so that the terms of trade elasticity of output in country c is decreasing in  and  1. Thus,
the better integrated a country is into the union and the more elastic is labour supply, the
less is its domestic output aected by variations in the terms of trade.
(39) is a crucial equilibrium condition in the present model, relating the eective terms of
trade of country c to the level of output in country c as well as the union-wide output. More
specically, from the perspective of country c the union-aggregate terms are exogenous. So
what turns out important for the dynamics within the country is the relation of domestic
prices to the level of domestic output in (39).
Note that if there is no LAMP, then (39) simplies to sc
t = ~ yc
t   ~ y
t, guaranteeing a
one-to-one negative relationship between prices and the level of output in country c. In the
presence of LAMP the terms of trade-elasticity of output is not necessarily equal to one.
Indeed, the elasticity of output with regard to the terms of trade is positive if and only if
c <
1




Note that if (41) is not fullled, we have a negative relation between the terms of trade and
domestic output. As the union-wide price level is exogenous from the point of view of a
particular country c what is more important than the terms of trade as such is that there
18is a negative relation between domestic output and domestic prices. This is assured as long
as (41) applies.
c also appears in the country-level IS relation, (37). The terms of trade elasticity is
thus equal to the negative of the elasticity of output with regard to the union-wide interest
rate. They thus switch sign at the same time. As discussed above, however, because the
nominal interest rate is exogenous from the country viewpoint, an IS relation in the true
sense exists only at the union-level. The determination of output at the country level is
instead governed by the terms of trade relation (39).
Generally, we expect a rise in the price level to lead to fall of demand and output. As
long as (41) is fullled this is also the case. For c < c this is not only the case; the presence
of Non-Ricardian consumers increases the fall in demand. For them the rise in the price
level reduces the real wage, which is their sole source of income. As a result, demand falls by
even more than in a full-participation economy. However, the same way the IS relation can
ip in the closed economy, as discussed in section 3.5 and Bilbiie (2008), the terms of trade
elasticity changes sign for c > c. Again the intuition lies in the interaction of the labour
and asset markets. If the labour supply elasticity is low and the rate of LAMP high, the
rise in the price level can lead to an expansion of output. The price level rise reduces real
wages, which in turn lowers marginal costs to producers. The increase in prots generates
an income eect, which leads to an overall expansion of output.
3.7 Union-Wide Mean Ratio of LAMP



















t dc + Cov[
c




t] is the covariance of the LAMP parameters with output across the
member countries. However, it is dicult to think of a systematic cross-country relationship
between these parameters and the output gap. As a result, I assume that the LAMP mean
ratio of LAMP is independent of output so that Cov[ c
1 c; ~ yc






























1   c dc (44)
is the union-wide mean ratio of Non-Ricardian to Ricardian agents.

















 . However, (44) is not directly observable, as
it is non-linear in the rate of LAMP; more precisely it is convex in the rate of LAMP.





around the expected level
of Non-Ricardian agents in the economy, E[], in order to relate the union-wide mean ratio











(1   E[])3 + Ojrj4; (45)
where Ojrj4 represents residuals of order 4 and higher. This approximation is accurate to
fourth order if we restrict attention to a symmetric distribution of LAMP. If we interpret
denominators of both fractions on the right-hand-side as weights on the numerators, we see
that the weight on the mean rate of LAMP, (1  E[]) 1, is smaller than the weight on the
variance of AMP, (1   E[]) 3. Due to the cubic term the weight on the variance of AMP
increases signicantly in the mean rate of LAMP. Thus, the higher the mean rate of LAMP,
the more its variance matters.
In place of the variance we can rewrite (45) in terms of the coecient of variation. The
coecient of variation is dened as the ratio of the standard-deviation to the mean: CV1  
p
E[(f1 g f1 E[]g)2]
(1 E[]) . The advantage of the coecient of variation is that it provides a
normalised unit-less measure of the dispersion of LAMP. Furthermore, the coecient of
variation is often used for distributions with high variance, which applies even more to the
squared coecient of variation. Using the coecient of variation, we can thus write the







 + CV 2
1 
1    + Ojrj4; (46)
where   E[] is the mean rate of LAMP in the union.
Only the union-wide Phillips curve is unaected by the considerations of the previous
10I am indebted to Bruno Strulovici for suggesting this approximation.
20section, as it is invariant to LAMP. I repeat it here for convenience. However, we can use
the approximation to the expected mean ratio (46) to simplify the union-wide IS relation
(38) as
~ y
t = Et~ y

















t = c~ yc
t   ~ y
t: (48)
Dierencing (48), we obtain a relation of the ination dierentials to output dierentials,
which proves useful in the optimal policy problem

t   c
t = c~ yc
t   ~ y
t: (49)
4 Determinacy
(36) and (47), together with either an optimal targeting rule or a specied Taylor rule for
the nominal interest rate constitute a complete system of the union-aggregates, output,
ination and the interest-rate as a function of union-wide cost-push and natural-interest
rate shocks.
Within the union, each individual country c is a small open economy with mass zero.
Due to this mass zero assumption, the determinacy conditions of the union-aggregates and
a single member country c are separate. As discussed in more detail in section 4.2, even if
we have a unique equilibrium for union-wide aggregates, we have to examine under what
conditions equilibrium determinacy obtains in a member country within the union.
4.1 Union-Wide Determinacy
Let us assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule of the form
^ {t = 'Et
t+1: (50)
21Plugging (50) into (47) gives, together with (36), a dynamic system of two endogenous
non-predetermined variables m
t  [~ y
t;

























5. As shown in appendix 7.6, we can then prove the
following conditions for the existence of a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 1 [Equilibrium Determinacy in the Union] Under the forward-looking
Taylor rule ^ {t = 'Et
t+1, the necessary and sucient conditions for equilibrium determi-
nacy at the level of the union are the following.
Case Interest-Elasticity of Output Taylor coecient Equilibrium
I () 1 > 0 ' 2 [1;1 +  2(1+)
 ] determinate
II () 1 < 0 ' 2 [1 +  2(1+)
 ;1] \ [0;1] determinate
III 0 > () 1 >  
2(1+)
 ' = 0 determinate
In case I, the monetary authority can achieve determinacy by following an instrument
rule which is called active, i.e. with coecient ' > 1. As (50) reacts to expected future
variables, the usual upper bound11 on ' applies. Case I is another instance where the
Taylor principle applies, which requires increases in the real interest in response to rising
ination.
In case II, where the inverse of the interest-elasticity of output is positive, a Taylor
rule which is passive, i.e. with a coecient smaller than one, can achieve determinacy. For a
passive rule the upper bound discussed becomes a lower bound. A passive rule means that,
while nominal interest is increased in the face of expected future ination, real rates fall. As
in case II, increases in the real interest-rate are contractionary, this achieves determinacy.
As the point of determinacy is to rule out self-fullling dynamics, let us consider briey how
a passive monetary policy rule can achieve this in the present case. Imagine there is a non-
11Cf. e.g. Bullard and Mitra (2002), Bernanke and Woodford (1997).
22fundamental fall in expected ination. Under a passive interest rate rule, nominal interest
rates are set lower, but by less than the reduction in expected ination, which causes the
real interest rate to increase. Given  < 0, the rising real interest rate leads to an increase
in output. This in turn creates ination, contradicting the initial non-fundamental decrease
in ination. Thus, the passive monetary policy rule achieves determinacy, ruling out self-
fullling dynamics.
While cases I and II show that for all values of LAMP the monetary authority can
achieve determinacy if reacting with the interest rate to union-wide endogenous conditions,
case III shows that determinacy can even obtain if the interest-rate is pegged, in the sense
of not responding to endogenous variables due to ' = 0. In the absence of LAMP case
III cannot arise. As discussed by Bilbiie (2008), the practical relevance of case III is
limited in the presence of a monetary authority which does react with the interest rate to
endogenous conditions. However, in the monetary union member setting, we will see that
an analogue of case III reappears at the country-level. As the union-wide interest-rate
reacts to union-wide aggregates and is thus exogenous from the perspective of any individual
country, and as countries are related to other union members through a currency-peg, case
III has more relevance at the level of member-countries, as discussed in more detail in
section 4.2.
Note that the conditions summarised in proposition 1 are analogous to those applying to
the closed economy examined in Bilbiie (2008). There is one crucial addition here, however,
as I allow for heterogeneity of LAMP across the union.
Corollary 1 [Dispersion] The dispersion of asset markets participation enters dynamics
and the conditions for determinacy. The higher the dispersion of AMP across the union,
the lower the mean rate of LAMP for which the interest-elasticity of output is positive.
() 1 increases in both the mean and the dispersion of LAMP. Therefor there is a
trade-o between mean and dispersion in determining the sign of the interest-elasticity of














1    (52)
and positive otherwise. If the rate of LAMP is homogenous across the union, i.e. CV1  = 0,




, which is the condition in the closed economy, as discussed in
section 3.5. This critical value for zero dispersion denes an upper bound for the critical
value we obtain when there is dispersion in (52). Ignoring dispersion would not only lead to
quantitatively incorrect values for the interest-elasticity of output; by (52) this could also
lead to the qualitatively wrong conclusion about the sign of the union-wide interest-elasticity
of output.
The fact that the dispersion of LAMP matters is essentially due to the non-linearity in
 of the expected mean ratio E[ 
1 ] . Due to this strong convexity, higher rates of LAMP
in some countries make the expected mean ratio disproportionately larger than lower rates
of LAMP in others.
The coecient and eect of dispersion increases in the inelasticity of labour supply  and
decreases in the steady state net markup . The higher is , the more are small variations in
hours and output associated with large variations in the real wage and thus consumption by
Non-Ricardian agents. Hence, consumption of Non-Ricardian agents can vary more across
union-members so that the dispersion of LAMP has greater eects.
A similar reason applies to the eect of . From the production function ^ yt = (1+)at+
(1 + )^ nt, we see that for a given change in output, hours worked vary more the larger .
The more hours vary, the less does the real wage and consumption by Non-Ricardian agents
change; so the dispersion of AMP matters less. As the mean of LAMP is also multiplicative
in

1+, these two parameters amplify the eects of the mean in the same way.
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the quantitative importance of taking the dispersion of asset
markets participation into account. Table 3 lists the critical values  for which case I
occurs and the IS relation is negatively sloped, as in the standard case. For illustrative
purposes the threshold values are calculated for dierent values of the inverse of the elasticity
of labour supply  and for dierent values of the coecient of variation of AMP, CV1 .
The values in Table 4 instead show the reduction in the critical value of  which is due to
CV1 .
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate two things in particular. Firstly, small values of CV1  reduce
the critical value of LAMP only by small amounts. If, however, CV1  is high, the threshold
value for LAMP is reduced considerably. Secondly, even for relatively small values of AMP,
the reduction in the threshold values can be signicant if the elasticity of labour supply is
small. For instance, considering the evidence on LAMP quoted in the introduction and the
24Table 3: Critical Values for Limited Asset Markets Participation
Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity 
Coe. of Var. CV 2
1  0.5 1 2 3 5
0.03 0.70 0.53 0.43 0.26 0.17
0.1 0.68 0.50 0.39 0.21 0.11
0.3 0.62 0.41 0.28 0.07 0
0.5 0.56 0.32 0.17 0 0
1 0.41 0.09 0 0 0
Notes: The values in the table are the critical values 
= 1=[(1+=(1+)] (=(1+)=[1+=(1+)] CV 2
1  in (52).
Table 4: Reduction in Critical Values for LAMP due to Dispersion of AMP
Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity 
Coe. of Var. CV 2
1  0.5 1 2 3 5
0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
0.1 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0.3 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.24
0.5 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.24 0.4
1 0.29 0.45 0.63 0.71 0.81
Notes: The values are (=(1+)=[1+=(1+)] CV 2
1  in (52).
values for 3calculated in Tables 1 and 2 it is easy to see that, rstly, the critical values in
Table 3 are of empirically relevant size and that ignoring the associated values in 3 could
be quantitatively and qualitatively inaccurate.
The role of dispersion for dynamics and determinacy identied here for heterogeneous
LAMP applies more generally to structural heterogeneity in a monetary union. It is quan-
titatively and qualitatively important to account for non-linearities in parameters when
aggregating them across countries. As shown by the approximation detailed in appendix
7.4, for any function of parameters the union-wide mean of the function of parameters will
not equal the function of the union-wide mean of the parameters when the function is non-
linear. For convex functions dispersion adds to the function of the mean, while for concave
functions dispersion subtracts from the function of the mean.
4.2 Country Determinacy
As mentioned above, determinacy of the union-wide equilibrium does not by itself guarantee
that a country c with measure zero exhibits itself equilibrium determinacy. This section fol-
lows the approach outlined in Gal  and Monacelli (2005) to derive conditions of determinacy
25in a specic country c.
The nominal interest rate is exogenous from the perspective of country c. ^ {t responds only
systematically to union-wide aggregates and not country-specic output and ination. That
exogeneity of the interest-rate leads to indeterminate equilibria, is, however, a standard-
result in the monetary policy literature, as discussed for instance in Woodford (2005), Gal 
(2009).
Indeed, if we compute the roots for the system of country-level Phillips curve (35) and
country-level IS relation (37), we nd the usual result that for interest-rate pegs equilibrium
is indeterminate; except for the odd-ball case 0 > (c) 1 >  
2(1+)
c , which corresponds
directly to case III describing a union-wide interest rate peg. However, as discussed in
Gal  and Monacelli (2005), considering the roots of (35) and (37) is, on the one hand,
mistaken as the country-level IS relation (37) is not an equilibrium relation in a currency-
union; only at the union-level is there an IS-relation in the proper sense. On the other hand,
it would mean disregarding an additional equilibrium condition, namely the terms of trade
relation (39) according to which the level of output is a function of the terms of trade. In
other words, as there is only a union-wide IS-relation, (39) determines how domestic output
is aected by the terms of trade. Indeed, as the union-wide price-level is exogenous from
the perspective of a particular country, the most important aspect of (39) is the relation
between the domestic level of output and the domestic price level.
In order to obtain valid conditions for the determinacy of a specic country c, we can
dierence the Phillips curve of country c (35) and the union (36) and combine it with the
condition relating the terms of trade and country c output (39). We then obtain a second



























The coecient on union-wide output is a shock to the eective terms of trade in country c.
However, this is the case if and only if the rate of LAMP in country c diers from that in
the rest of the union. If the rate of LAMP is positive but homogenous across all countries,
the coecient on ~ y
t in (53) is zero.
26Stability, however, depends on the roots of the second order dierence equation of the









where determinacy obtains if out of the two roots of (55) one lies outside and one lies inside
the unit circle. As proven in appendix 7.7, we can establish the following.
Proposition 2 [Determinacy in Country c] Determinacy in country c depends on the
following conditions.
Case LAMP Terms of Trade Elasticity of Output Equilibrium
Ic 0 < c < 1
1+(1 )












1+ 0 >  
2(1+)







1+ < c < 1 0 > (c) 1 >  
2(1+)
c indeterminate
Corollary 2 [Indeterminacy under Limited Asset Markets Participation] Un-
der heterogeneous limited asset markets participation equilibrium determinacy of union-wide
aggregates does not guarantee determinacy in every country of measure 0.
Corollary 3 [Complete Openness Guarantees Determinacy] The less home bias
a country exhibits, the higher the rate of LAMP for which the desirable case Ic occurs. If a
country is completely open, determinacy is guaranteed regardless of the level of limited asset
markets participation, the elasticity of labour supply and other parameters.
To illustrate these results Figure 1 plots the rates of LAMP of an individual country for
which the three dierent cases arise, as a function of the openness parameter  2 [0;1], where
for  = 0 a country is a closed economy, while for  = 1 a country exhibits no home bias













. For the net markup I assume  = 0:2 as in
Bilbiie (2008), while for   = 0:66 (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). Next to the openness
parameter, the second key parameter determining which of the cases arises is the elasticity
of labour supply . For more elastic labour supply, higher values of LAMP are consistent
27Figure 1: Determinacy Regions as Function of Openness and LAMP












































with case Ic. This can be seen from comparing the left graph for elastic labour supply with
the right graph with inelastic labour supply.
In case Ic the terms of trade-elasticity is positive and the equilibrium is determinate with
smooth dynamics. Indeed, as the union-wide price-level is exogenous from the perspective
of a country, what matters is that there is a negative relation between domestic prices in
country c and output in country c.
In case IIc the terms of trade elasticity is negative and very large in absolute value,
making domestic output virtually inelastic to the domestic price-level. While equilibrium
determinacy obtains, dynamics are oscillatory. Note, however, that case IIc generally ap-
plies only to a very narrow range of c.
Case IIIc applies to even larger values for LAMP which are are consistent with virtually
the entire range of negative terms of trade elasticities. Apart from the intermediate case
IIc we thus obtain equilibrium determinacy for a positive terms of trade elasticity and
equilibrium indeterminacy for negative terms of trade elasticity.
The key to understanding these results is that risk in country c is shared with the
rest of the union only by the Ricardian agents, as seen from the risk sharing condition
(22). Obviously, the larger the share of Ricardian agents, the more a country can share
risk internationally. Furthermore, we see that the correlation of Ricardian consumption in
country c with that in the union is higher, the more open the country is.
A dierent way to see the role of openness is that home bias leads to deviations from
purchasing-power-parity (PPP). This in turn is due to the fact that home-bias attributes to
28consumption produced in the domestic country a higher weight in total consumption than
its weight within the union. The greater the deviation from PPP, the lower the level of risk
sharing for which equilibrium determinacy in country c can be sustained.
The country determinacy conditions can be interpreted as conditions on the determi-
nate transmission of policy which set at the union-level into each country. Monetary policy
is set in response to union-wide aggregates. Proposition 1 summarises the conditions on
monetary policy to achieve a unique rational expectations equilibrium for union-wide ag-
gregates. Proposition 2 then shows conditions under which the currency peg to the union
transmits policy so that there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium in each country.
Under imperfect risk sharing, the latter needs to be taken into account in addition to the
union-wide conditions.
4.3 Heterogenous Openness
So far I have assumed that the parameter determining a country's openness, , is the same
for all countries in the union. However, I imply in the discussion of proposition 2 that what
matters for a country is primarily its own openness towards other countries, rather than the
openness of the remaining countries towards itself. In this section I allow  to vary across
countries by indexing it by c, as it is done with c in the rest of the paper. This way I
will show that, indeed, what matters for the determinacy in country c is its own openness
towards the others, i.e. c, rather than the openness of the other countries
R 1
0 cdc = .
In section 4.2 we see that non-oscillatory determinacy obtains if and only if case Ic
occurs. Case Ic, in turn, only occurs if and only if the relation between domestic output ~ yc
t
and domestic prices pc
t is negative. Here I show that if we allow  to vary across country,
i.e. c 6= f, then for any country c case Ic obtains if and only if
0 < c <
1




As the home bias parameter  does not appear in the union-wide relations (47) and (36),
these are unaected by the generalisation of . However, the country Phillips curve (35) and
the terms of trade relation (49) no longer apply. As shown in appendix 7.8 for heterogenous
29openness, the Phillips curve is
c
t =Et+1c
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while the terms of trade equation becomes
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t =   (1   c + )pc















Note that (57) and (58) reduce to (35) and (49) for  = c = . What matters for
determinacy in (58) is that ~ yc
t and pc
t are of opposite sign. This is the case if and only if
(56) applies.
5 Optimal Policy
We nd the optimal policy by minimising the quadratic loss function subject to linear
constraints, thus providing a valid approximation to the non-linear problem. The quadratic
loss function is found as a second order approximation to the households' utility, as shown
in appendix 7.5. As policy is set by the union-wide monetary authority, we also solve the
union-wide optimal policy problem.
As in the closed economy of Bilbiie (2008), country-level utility is given by a weighted
sum of the utility of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian agents. The weight in this sum is given
by the mass of Ricardian versus Non-Ricardian agents in the population, i.e. c. Under
the assumption that the steady state is ecient and equitable, where the latter means
that consumption of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers is equalised, we obtain a loss
function as a second order approximation to country-level utility. The union-wide loss
function is then obtained by integrating over the utility of all countries. As demonstrated



























 . This section considers the optimal interest rate policy under discretion.
Regarding the union-wide problem, the method follows Gal  and Monacelli (2008). The
monetary authority sets the optimal path for the nominal interest rate f{tg1
t=0 to minimise
the union-wide social loss (59). The optimal nominal interest rate path can be obtained
residually from the union-wide IS relation (47), as a function of optimal paths for union-
wide ination and output. Thus, in a rst-stage of optimisation the monetary authority
sets fc
tg1
t=0 and f~ yc
tg1
t=0, 8 c 2 [0;1] to minimise (59) subject to several constraints: rstly,
for each country the Phillips curve (35); secondly, the terms of trade (49), as these govern


































t+1 + c~ yc























































t are Lagrange-multipliers on the Phillips curve (35), the terms of
trade (49) and the two aggregation constraints (60). The introduction of the two aggregation
constraints requires not only nding rst order conditions to c
t and ~ yc
t but also 
t and ~ y
t.
31The rst order conditions for c
t, ~ yc
t, 












































t = 0: (65)





t dc. Again assuming independence between parameter c and output, we







 = (1 + )
 

1 + CV 2
1 
1    : (67)
This optimal targeting rule displays the usual lean-against-the-wind property: when
ination is above the natural rate, it is optimal to contract output below target. How ag-
gressively output should be reduced, depends positively on the ination elasticity of output
 and inversely on the weight on output in the loss function .  increases in both the
mean rate of LAMP  and the dispersion of AMP CV1 . Higher mean and variance of
LAMP thus tend to make lower output movements more desirable.
That higher levels of both mean and variance of LAMP increase optimal ination relative
to output volatility can also be seen from the closed form solutions for ination and output.
Assuming the cost-push shock follows an AR(1) process Etu
t+1 = uut, with u 2 (0;1), we









()2 + (1   u))
u
t: (68)
We thus can establish the following property of the optimal targeting-rule in a heterogeneous
union.
Proposition 3 [Optimal Targeting Rule under Heterogenous Limited Asset
32Markets Participation] Under the optimal targeting rule in the presence of heterogeneity,
the desired ination volatility increases in the mean of LAMP and the dispersion of AMP,
while the desired output volatility decreases in the mean of LAMP and the dispersion of
AMP.
Plugging the reduced form solutions (68) into the IS relation (47) we can solve for an
optimal Taylor-rule in expected ination as a function of the optimal targeting rule12
^ { = 'opt
 Ett+1; (69)
where the optimal Taylor-rule coecient is given by
'opt





Let us examine '
opt
 for  > 0. As  decreases in both the mean and dispersion of LAMP
and  increases in both the mean and dispersion of LAMP, we see that the optimal Taylor-
rule coecient decreases in both the mean and dispersion of LAMP. Thus, the higher the
mean of LAMP and dispersion of AMP, the softer should be the response of the nominal
interest rate to expected ination.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds a tractable model of a currency union characterised by heterogenous limi-
ted asset markets participation (LAMP) for the analysis of monetary policy. Heterogenous
LAMP leads to the failure of perfect risk sharing and asymmetric transmission channels
across member countries, two important features of currency unions in the real world.
If the rate of LAMP increases beyond a threshold value aggregate demand dynamics
become non-standard, with nominal interest rate rises expanding output. I show how to
capture the heterogeneity of asset markets participation in a single statistic of dispersion, the
coecient of variation of asset markets participation. Dispersion becomes a key parameter
in union-wide dynamics. This is essentially due to the fact that LAMP has a strongly
non-linear eect on the dynamics of individual countries. As a particular rate of LAMP
12While (69) delivers determinacy, implied optimal Taylor-rules are neither unique nor necessarily deter-
minate, as discussed by Jensen (2002).
33is specic to individual countries, its distribution across the union becomes key. I show
that greater dispersion reduces the threshold value of LAMP for which standard aggregate
dynamics, i.e. a negative interest-elasticity of output, obtain.
I demonstrate that if the interest-elasticity of output is negative, the monetary authority
should follow an active Taylor rule to achieve equilibrium determinacy. If, by contrast, the
interest elasticity of output is positive, the monetary authority should follow a passive Taylor
rule. As the threshold mean value of LAMP in the union for which the interest-elasticity
of union-wide output changes sign is lower, the higher is the dispersion of asset markets
participation, ignoring dispersion can lead to both qualitatively and quantitatively wrong
conclusions about aggregate demand dynamics and the required interest rate policy in a
currency union.
Countries are modelled as small open economies which haver measure zero within the
union. Thus, the interest rate which is set in response to union-wide aggregates does not
respond explicitly to the conditions in a specic countries. In this sense, the union-wide
interest rate is exogenous from the point of view of the member countries. As a result, we
do not only have to consider the determinacy conditions for union-wide aggregates; we also
have to check for determinacy in ever single country. The key link between the country and
the union here are a relation between a country's terms of trade and output. Fundamentally,
determinacy in a specic country requires the terms of trade to be stationary. With this
condition I show that a member country can exhibit equilibrium determinacy if its rate of
LAMP exceeds a certain threshold value. The reason is two-fold. Firstly, a high rate of
LAMP can lead to non-standard aggregate dynamics in the country. Secondly, the rate of
LAMP determines the degree of risk sharing of a country with the rest of the union. If
dynamics are non-standard and too little risk is shared, indeterminacy can obtain.
However, the more open a country is in trade terms towards the rest of the union, the
larger the range of LAMP for which a country can maintain equilibrium determinacy. If a
country has no home bias at all and is completely open to the rest of the union, determinacy
obtains regardless of the rate of LAMP. The results on country-level determinacy, that a
lower level of LAMP and a higher degree of openness are paramount to assuring determinacy
shows how important nancial and trade integration are for the eective function of a
currency union.
I also characterise optimal union-wide monetary policy in the presence of heterogeneity.
34Again, a greater level of dispersion of asset markets participation has fundamentally the
same eect as a lower mean rate of LAMP across the union. We thus nd that under the
optimal targeting rule in the presence of heterogeneity, the desired ination volatility in-
creases in the mean of LAMP and the dispersion of AMP, while the desired output volatility
decreases in the mean of LAMP and the dispersion of AMP. Solving for an implied optimal
Taylor rule as a function of expected ination, we see that the nominal interest rate should
respond more aggressively to expected ination the lower the mean rate of LAMP and the
lower the dispersion of AMP.
357 Appendix
7.1 Notation
For any variable Xt, let xt  lnXt, that is lower case variables denote logs, unless otherwise
noted. The steady state of Xt carries no time subscript and is written X. The value of
Xt under exible prices is called its natural rate, i.e. Xn
t . In this paper we will make
assumptions ensuring that the natural rate is also ecient. The log-deviation of Xt is
dened and written as ^ xt = xt   x. Gap variables, in turn, are dened as the dierence
between the log-deviation of the current rate of Xt from steady state and the log-deviation of
the natural rate from steady state, i.e. ~ xt = ^ xt ^ xn
t . All country variables are superscripted
with c, as in xc





7.2 Steady State Relations














































t (j)dj. Aggregate hours are
R 1
0 Nc































Log-linearised this becomes dc






t is dened as a share of
output, dc
t  lnDc
t   lnY c to allow for zero steady state prots.
Steady State Prot Share in Output In steady state price-dispersion is absent: c
t =













Real Earnings Share in Output In steady state, we have Pc = (1+)MCc = (1+)Wc
Ac .
Recalling the production function Y c = AcNc Fc this becomes
N Wc
Pc
Y c+Fc(1+) = 1, which in








Consumption Shares in Output Using (10) and conditioning on an optimal allocation



























t . Assume that the steady
state hours of both types of agents are the same, i.e. NR;c = NN;c = Nc. In steady state
we have PCR;c = 1
1 cPcDc + WcNR;c. Using the production function Y c + AcNc   Fc,
this becomes CR;c = 1
1 cDc + Y c+Fc
1+ . Using the expression for the steady state share
of prots, the steady state share of the consumption of Ricardian households in output is
CR;c








The budget constraint of non-Ricardian consumers (19) in steady state is PcCN;c =






7.3 Goods Market Clearing













































t + (1   )sc
t]:









t + (1   )sc
t]:
For the symmetric steady state this simplies to (30).






Taking a Taylor-expansion of f(x) around E[x], gives
f(x) = f(E[x]) + f0 (E[x])(x   E[x]) +
f00(E[x])
2
(x   E[x])2 +
f000(E[x])
6
(x   E[x])3 + :::
37Taking expectations of the previous expression we obtain










Note that for symmetric distributions
f000(E[x])
6 E[(x   E[x])3] = 0. This is assumed here.
Given the functional form of (71), we obtain (46).
7.5 Loss Function











The loss function used in the text is a general case of this with . The general case is
considered for convenience without aecting any result.
Assume that the steady state is ecient and that steady state shares of consumption
are equal across agents and countries.13 Then in steady state we have







where NR;c = NN;c = N = Y and CR;c = CN;c = C = Y .
Assume that the social planner maximises the union-wide utility, where in each country
the utility is a convex combination of the utilities of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consu-














Let Z denote the type of consumer, i.e. Z 2 [N;R]. Then for each type Z the second order
13As discussed inter alia in Woodford (2003), this is ensured by a assuming a scal authority taxing sales
at a constant rate  and redistributing the proceedings through lump-sum payments T so that in steady




Pt Nt(j)+Tt. For Tt = Pt(j)Yt(j) the budget is balanced. Eciency is achieved by setting  =  . Then
the exible price equilibrium is ecient with P
e




t(j), where the variables with superscript
e denote the ecient exible price values.










































+ t:i:p: + Okak3:
(73)
Noting that UCCR = UCCN = UCC = VNNR = VNNR = VNN and that14 ^ c
R;n
t = ^ c
N;n
t = ^ cn
t ,


































+ t:i:p: + Okak3:
(74)
We can develop the linear terms
~ cc
t + (1   )^ c
c;n
t ~ cc
t   ~ nc




From the production function we nd
~ nc
t = ~ yc
t + lnc
t: (76)
Substituting (76) into (75) for ~ nc
t, and substituting (33) into (75) for ~ cc
t, we obtain
~ yc
t   ~ yc
t | {z }
=0
+(1   )^ c
c;n
t ~ yc
t   (1   )^ c
c;n
t ~ yc











































0. As the linear terms in (75) boil down to c   lnc





















t )2 + (1   c)(~ n
R;c
t )2 + lnc
t

+ t:i:p: + Okak3:
(78)
In the case of log-utility, to which at this stage we restrict attention in the main text  = 1.
Then second order terms in consumption drop out and the labour supply of Non-Ricardian
14This is due to the fact that in the exible-price equilibrium prots are zero.






 c + (1   c)(~ n
R;c
t )2 + lnc
t

+ t:i:p: + Okak3: (79)
Approximating (25) to second order around the ecient steady state, we obtain
~ nc
t = ~ yc
t + lnc
t: (80)
Using (80) together with the fact that in the log-utility case ^ n
N;c












+ t:i:p: + Okak3: (81)













This makes use of Lemma 1 in Gal  and Monacelli (2008), which demonstrates that lnt '

2V arjpt(j) and Woodford (2003), ch.6, showing that
P1
t=0 tV arjpt(j) =   1 P1
t=0 tt +
t:i:p: + Okak3. Applying the approximations (81) and (82) to (78), we obtain the loss





















t + t:i:p: + Okak3: (83)





















t)2 + c(~ yc
t)2 dc; (84)




 . Note that the term c which is present in (83) drops out of the
union-wide loss function as
R 1
0 c
t dc = 0.
7.6 Union-Wide Determinacy
This section proves Proposition 1.
40Proof. By Blanchard and Kahn (1980) determinacy of (51) requires both of the roots of  
to lie outside the unit circle. By Woodford (2003), appendix E, this requires as necessary and
sucient condition that either all the conditions (1), i.e. (1.a) det  > 1, (1.b)det +tr +
1 > 0, (1.c) det    tr  + 1 > 0, or all the conditions (2), i.e. (2.a) det  + tr  + 1 < 0,
(2.b) det    tr  + 1 < 0 are fullled. We have det  =  1 and tr  = 1 +  1  
 1() 1(   1). It is straightforward to show that Condition (2) never holds. (1a) is
trivially fullled. For  > 0, (1b) requires  < 1 +  2(1+)
 and (1c) requires ( > 0),
which gives case I. For  < 0, (1b) requires  < 1 while (1c) requires  > 1+ 2(1+)
 ,
which gives case II. For ( < 0) if  = 0 (1b) and (1c) are also fullled if and only if
1 +  2(1+)
 < 0, which gives case III.
7.7 Country Determinacy










2$c , where $c is dened in (54).
Lemma 1 For c=c > 0 and c=c <  2(1 + ) the roots &c
1 and &c
2 are real. For 0 >
c=c >  2(1 + ) the roots &c
1 and &c
2 are complex conjugates.
Proof. &c
1;2 are real if and only if 1   4($c)2 > 0. This requires that (1   )2 + (1 +  +
c=c)2 > (1+)2. For usual values for the subjective discount rate  we have (1 )2 ' 0.
Thus, the roots are real if and only if (1 +  + c=c)2 > (1 + )2.
Lemma 2 For c=c > 0 and c=c <  2(1 + ) the root j&c
1j > 1.





2j$cj < 1. This would require the
following to hold
p
1   4j$cj2 < 2j$cj   1: (85)
Consider the RHS for c=c > 0. For these values the RHS becomes
2
1++c=c   1 > 0 ,
   1 > c=c. As    1 < 0 and we have assumed c=c > 0, this yields a contradiction.
Thus, for c=c > 0 &c
1 is outside the unit circle. Consider the RHS for c=c <  2(1+). To
this end let c=c   2(1+)  for an arbitrarily small  > 0. Then the RHS of (85) requires
2
j1+ [2(1+)+]j  1 > 0. This is equivalent to requiring 2 > j (1++)j ,  1 > . As
 1 < 0 and we have assumed  > 0, we obtain a contradiction. Thus, for c=c <  2(1+),
&c
1 is outside the unit circle.
41Lemma 3 For c=c > 0, the root 0 < &c
2 < 1. For c=c <  2(1+), the root 0 > &c
2 >  1.





2j$cj < 1. This can be rewritten
as 1 2j$cj <
p
1   4j$cj2. From the previous section we know that both for c=c > 0
and c=c <  2(1 + ) the LHS is great than zero, as is the RHS. Thus, it is valid to





(86) is satised if and only if either c=c > 0, in which case 1 > &c
2 > 0 or c=c <
 2(1 + ) , 1 + c 2(1+)
c < 0 in which case 0 > &c
2 >  1.
Lemma 4 For 0 > c=c >  2(1 + ), the roots j&c
1j;j&c
2j > 1.






conjugates which can be written as &c
1 = a + b{ and &c




2$c , and { 
p
 1. Complex conjugate roots always have the same absolute value.
Consider whether both complex root lie inside the unit circle. This is the case if and only
if
p










< 1. With $c from (54) this can
be simplied to 2c
c(1 + ) + (c
c)2 < 2   1. For usual values of , the RHS can be safely
assumed to be 2   1 ' 0 so that we require
2
c
c (1 + ) + (
c
c )2 < 0: (87)
The LHS equals zero for c
c = 0 and c
c =  2(1+). The quadratic function in c
c is strictly
convex so that (87) is fullled if and only if 0 > c
c >  2(1 + ).
7.8 Heterogenous Openness
















. The optimal allocation of expenditures (9) between
domestic and imported goods is now given by Pc
t C
Z;c

























t )1 c . Log-linearising
42and integrating over countries the international risk sharing condition is
^ c
R;c
t = ^ c
R;
t + (1   )p
t   (1   c)pc
t; (88)
where, in analogy to the assumption Cov[ c
1 c; ~ yc
t] in section 3.7, I make the assumption
that Cov[c;pc




t directly; the dierent  introduce a wedge into the terms of trade, so
we have to write the condition in terms of the price-level.
To nd the goods market clearing condition we can follow the steps in section 3.3.
Making the additional assumption that Cov[c;Cc

























. Then, the equivalent of equa-
tion (30) is
^ yc
t = (1   c)csc
t + (1   c)^ cc
t + sc
t + ^ c
t: (89)
To obtain (57) and (58) we can then use (88) and (89) and otherwise just follow exactly the
steps outlined in the text to derive (35) and (49).
43Bibliography
Beetsma, R. and Jensen, H. (2005). Monetary and scal policy interactions in a micro-
founded model of a monetary union, Journal of International Economics 67(2): 320{352.
Benigno, P. (2004). Optimal monetary policy in a currency area, Journal of International
Economics 63(2): 293{320.
Bernanke, B. and Woodford, M. (1997). Ination forecasts and monetary policy, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 29(4): 653{684.
Bilbiie, F. (2005). Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted)
Keynesian logic, Working Paper 09/2005, Nueld College, Oxford.
Bilbiie, F. (2008). Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted)
Keynesian logic, Journal of Economic Theory 140(1): 162{196.
Bilbiie, F. and Straub, R. (2006). Asset-market participation, monetary policy rules, and
the great ination, IMF Working Paper WP/06/200, International Monetary Fund.
Blanchard, O. and Kahn, C. (1980). The solution of linear dierence models under rational
expectations, Econometrica 48(5): 1305{1311.
Bullard, J. and Mitra, K. (2002). Learning about monetary policy rules, Journal of Monetary
Economics 49(6): 1105{1129.
Calvo, G. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework, Journal of Monetary
Economics 12(3): 383{398.
Campbell, J. and Mankiw, N. G. (1989). Consumption, income and interest rates: Reinter-
preting the time series evidence, in O. Blanchard and S. Fisher (eds), NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual, MIT Press, pp. 185{216.
Caner, A. and Wol, E. (2004). Asset poverty in the United States, 1984-99: Evidence from
the panel study of income dynamics, Review of Income and Wealth 50(4): 493{518.
Cecchetti, S. (1999). Legal structure, nancial structure, and the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism, Working Paper 7151, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Christelis, D., Georgakos, D. and Haliassos, M. (2009). Economic integration and mature
portfolios, mimeo, Goethe University Frankfurt.
Clarida, R., Gal , J. and Gertler, M. (1999). The science of monetary policy: A New
Keynesian perspective, Journal of Economic Literature 37(4): 1661{1707.
Coenen, G. and Straub, R. (2005). Does government spending crowd in private consump-
tion?, International Finance 8(3): 435{470.
European Central Bank (2009). Housing nance in the euro area, European Central Bank
Structural Issues Report .
44Gal , J. (2008). Monetary Policy, Ination, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the
New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press.
Gal , J. (2009). Constant interest rate projections without the curse of indeterminacy: A
note, International Journal of Economic Theory 5: 61{68.
Gal , J., L opez-Salido, D. and Vall es, J. (2004). Rule-of-thumb consumers and the design
of interest rate rules, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36(4): 739{764.
Gal , J. and Monacelli, T. (2005). Optimal monetary and scal policy in a currency union,
Working Paper 11815, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gal , J. and Monacelli, T. (2008). Optimal monetary and scal policy in a currency union,
Journal of International Economics 76: 116{132.
Jensen, H. (2002). Monetary policy frameworks and real equilibrium determinacy, mimeo,
University of Copenhagen.
Maclennan, D., Muellbauer, J. and Stevens, M. (1999). Asymmetries in housing and nancial
market institutions and EMU, Discussion Paper 2062, CEPR.
McKinnon, R. (1963). Optimal currency areas, American Economic Review 53(4): 717{725.
Muellbauer, J. (2007). Housing, credit and consumer expenditure, mimeo, University of
Oxford.
Mulligan, C. and Sala-i Martin, X. (2000). Extensive margins and the demand for money
at low interest rates, Journal of Political Economy 108(5): 961{991.
Rotemberg, J. and Woodford, M. (1997). An optimization-based econometric model for the
evaluation of monetary policy, in B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg (eds), NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 1997, MIT Press, pp. 297{346.
Vissing-Jrgensen, A. (2002). Limited asset market participation and the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, Journal of Political Economy 110(4): 825{853.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Woodford, M. (2005). Central bank communication and policy eectiveness, Working Paper
11898, National Bureau of Economic Research.
45